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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Theft of Lost, 
Mislaid or Mistakenly Delivered Property, a felony of the Third 
Degree. Jurisdiction vests in this Court pursuant to Rule 26, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 78-2A-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTFD ON APPEAL 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in not dismissing for cause a 
juror who was related by marriage to a prosecution witness and 
who knew the witness well? Standard of Review: "A motion to 
dismiss a prospective juror for cause is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. When reviewing such a ruling, we 
reverse only if the trial court has abused its discretion. State 
v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 826 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1991), cited in State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 
App 1992). 
Did the State produce sufficient evidence to support 
the verdict of the jury? Standard of Review: Evidence must be 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the Defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 902, 903 (Utah App. 1990). 
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Did the trial Court abuse its discretion by failing to 
consider all legally relevant factors in imposing an excessive 
sentence? Standard of Review: Actions of trial judge were so 
inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion. State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885. (Utah 1978). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Rule 18, Utah Rules Criminal Procedure 
Section 76-3-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant Dale Richard Schultz was charged by 
Information (R-1) with Theft of Lost, Mislaid, or Mistakenly 
Delivered Property, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 
Section 76-6-407, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in the 
Seventh District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah for 
acts allegedly occurring on or about April 15, 1992. Defendant 
was accused of obtaining golf clubs with a value of more than 
$250.00 but less than $1,000.00, without having taken reasonable 
means to return them to the owner, with the purpose of depriving 
the owner of the property. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant's First Appearance was on August 20, 1992. 
After a Preliminary Hearing on September 9, 1992, the Honorable 
Bruce K. Halliday signed a bindover order. Arraignment was 
October 14, 1992 before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell. 
A one day jury trial was held on January 25, 1993, 
presided over by Judge Halliday. 
At trial, before Voir Dire some potential jurors were 
excused due to personal or business relationships and "some of 
the rest of it," (Trial Transcript - 5, hereafter Tr. Tr.). 
After the swearing of the venire panel the jurors were questioned 
as to their relationship to counsel (Tr. Tr. - 8); relationship 
to the county attorney (Tr. Tr. - 9); consanguinity or affinity 
to witnesses or counsel (Tr. Tr. - 10); relation to law 
enforcement personnel (Tr. Tr. - 15); and again personal 
relationship to counsel or witnesses (Tr. Tr. - 25-6). One 
juror, Ray Dean Hopper, Juror #17 on the Jury List (R-96), 
responded that his son was married to the daughter of Glen 
Richeson, a witness for the State (Tr. Tr - 26), When questioned 
by the Court as to whether this relationship would affect his 
credence of Mr. Richeson's Testimony over that of another witness 
Mr. Hopper responded "I don't know." (Tr. Tr. 27). When asked 
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by the Court if he could proceed if he didn't believe Mr. 
Richeson's testimony, juror Hopper responded "No." (Tr. Tr. -
27). 
Although there is a very brief interval in which Juror 
Hopper grudgingly states that he can make up his mind on the 
basis of the testimony elicited, his final opinion as to whether 
he can fairly judge all of the testimony presented here is "I - I 
guess not, probably not"! (Tr. Tr. - 28). 
Counsel for Defendant made a tiny challenge for cause 
of Mr. Hopper (Tr. Tr. - 30), which was denied by the Court (Tr. 
Tr. - 31). 
During trial the owner of the golf clubs alleged that 
he had seen the Defendant on the night the clubs were lost and 
identified him at counsel table (Tr. Tr. - 56), despite not 
having been able to identify him proximate to the time of the 
incident from a photo line-up. (Tr. Tr. 57, 105). 
During trial several witnesses testified that Mr. 
Schultz had told them that he had found the golf clubs in a creek 
by the high school (Tr. Tr. - 75, 84, 97, 101, 110, 112). In 
fact, when interviewed by the police as a suspect, Mr. Schultz 
provided a written statement that he had found the clubs in the 
creek (Tr. Tr. - 110). Defendant took the stand and testified 
that he had found the clubs (Tr. Tr. - 114). 
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C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
After a verdict of guilty by the jury, the Court 
deferred sentencing for the preparation of a pre-sentence report 
(Tr. Tr. - 160). At the first scheduled sentencing Defendant was 
absent due to his placement in the Open Door Mission in Omaha, 
Nebraska (February 24 Sentencing Transcript - 2 (SI)). Due to 
his presence there, Adult Parole and Probation had been unable to 
prepare a pre-sentence report (SI - 3). Mr. Schultz did contact 
his attorney with his whereabouts (SI - 3). 
The Court issued a warrant for his arrest. 
At the second sentencing hearing counsel requested that 
the Defendant be evaluated by Adult Parole and Probation as 
originally ordered by the Court (June 16, 1993 Sentencing 
Transcript - 2 (S-2)). Despite the arguments of counsel that 
Defendant was attempting to rehabilitate himself, had had counsel 
in Nebraska, may not have known where to report, had no felony 
conviction since 1981, had not caused significant loss to the 
victim, and had already served substantial jail time in Grand 
County (S-2 - 3-6), the Court sentenced Defendant to the maximum 
term of imprisonment ignoring its previous concern 
that a pre-sentence report would be valuable in assessing this 
Defendant. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court both failed to adequately probe the 
bias of juror Hopper, denying Defendant his right to an impartial 
jury and wrongfully denied Defendant's challenge for cause of 
Hopper. 
The substantive case presented by the State is so 
inherently weak that reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable 
doubt as to Defendant's guilt. 
The trial court improperly abused its discretion in 
denying Defendant additional time before sentencing to allow his 
continued rehabilitation and for a pre-sentence report. 
ARGUMENT 
I. JUROR BIAS 
The Court of Appeals has previously defined the 
investigation necessary by the court to prove potential bias by a 
juror. While the level of investigation necessary once Voir Dire 
reveals potential juror bias varies from case to case, the 
exploration thereof cannot mearly be pro forma. Nor is the 
inference of bias rebutted simply by a subsequent general 
statement by the juror that he or she can be impartial. State v. 
Woolley, 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1991). 
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Defendant has a right to a fair and impartial panel of 
jurors in a criminal trial State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 
1984). Indeed, the trial court itself seemed more than 
adequately aware of that requirement when it sua sponte excused 
jurors as noted (Tr. Tr. - 5). Further the court showed regard 
for Defendant's rights in it Voir Dire. However, once the trial 
Court discovered the bias, no adequate rehabilitation of panelist 
Hopper occurred. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(3) & (4) state 
that grounds for a challenge for cause are consanguinity or 
affinity, or the existence of any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror, 
and any party, witness or person.... Section (e)(14) of Rule 18 
Utah Rules Criminal Procedure allows a challenge for cause if the 
juror has a state of mind which will prevent him [her] from 
acting impartially and without prejudice. Thus three grounds 
validate Defendant's challenge. 
Although Wool ley, supra, is helpful in determining the 
depths of inquiry sufficient to clarify potential juror bias, the 
point is really moot. In the instant case, after the Court's 
inquiry was completed, the challenged juror, far from being 
rehabilitated allowed as to how he could probably not judge all 
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of the testimony presented impartially. "When comments are made 
which facially question a prospective juror's partiality or 
prejudice, an abuse of discretion may occur unless the challenged 
juror is removed by the Court or counsel investigates and finds 
the inference rebutted" State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 
App. 1992), citing State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 
1989). Panelist Hopper was neither removed nor the inference 
rebutted. 
The Cox case, at 659, again citing Cobb provides, "[I]t 
is prejudicial error to compel a party to exercise a peremptory 
challenge to remove a jury panel member who should have been 
removed for cause." In this case, Defendant did not even have a 
challenge left with which to remove Hopper, presumably because 
other panelists existed who caused greater concern. The decision 
by the Court to leave that juror on the panel was thus fatally 
prejudicial to Defendant. "A juror, who through a personal 
association with a witness or party has developed a relationship 
of affection, respect or esteem, cannot be deemed disinterested, 
indifferent or impartial.. State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802 
(Utah 1977). Leaving such a juror is reversible error by the 
Court. 
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II- SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
At trial the State presented the owner of the golf 
clubs and his father. The owner, Derek Daye, testified that on 
April 15, 1992 he went on a golf trip with his high school team 
(Tr. Tr. - 49-50). Upon the return to Moab, he left his golf 
clubs outside City Market. He identified the clubs by brand name 
(Tr. Tr. - 51), and by referring to State's exhibit 1, which were 
photographs of the golf clubs (Tr. Tr. - 53) recovered from 
Defendant. He identified the Defendant as having been in his 
vicinity on April 15 (Tr. Tr. - 56.7). 
His father, Robert Daye similarly identified the clubs 
by brand name (Tr. Tr. - 45) and through exhibit 1 (Tr. Tr. -
44) . 
The individual who was in possession of the clubs when 
they were recovered by law enforcement, William Williams, 
testified that he purchased them from Defendant (Tr. Tr. - 68). 
The clubs were recovered May 27, 1993 (Tr. Tr. - 65) and were 
purchased by Mr. Williams about two weeks prior to that time (Tr. 
Tr. - 68) . 
There was adequate testimony from a golf professional 
as to value (Tr. Tr. - 91). 
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Defendant made an oral and a written statement to the 
police acknowledging that he had had possession of the clubs and 
had delivered them to Mr. Williams. The Statements varied as to 
whether he had sold them or given them away (Tr. Tr. - 102). 
Defendant testified at trial that he gave the clubs to 
Mr. Wi11iams (Tr. Tr. - 116). 
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
The above section sets out every scrap of competent 
evidence supporting the jury verdict. For from being a 
magnificent array, the paucity of the above strengthens 
Defendant's position that the verdict is unwarranted and 
untenable even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Court below. State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991), 
citing State v, Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990) and 
Schurf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
While this Court must view the evidence, along with the 
reasonable inferences from it, in the light most favorable to the 
verdict Moore, supra and State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 
(Utah 1989), if the Court finds that "the evidence and its 
inferences are so inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" then 
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the verdict must be overturned, State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983). This is exactly the conclusion Defendant 
argues. 
The fatal flaw in the State's case is the lack of any 
evidence of wrongdoing by Defendant. In a similar case, State v. 
Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah App. 1990) the Defendant asserted he 
did not know the received property was stolen and thus lacked the 
culpable mental state. Although the Court of Appeals did not 
reverse, the reasons to disbelieve Defendant in that case were 
substantially convincing. That case involved seven transactions 
occurring from July 1985 to May 1986. The property was received 
in a manner which should have raised questions about its status. 
We have no analogy in this case. Defendant found the 
golf clubs. He did not purchase them from an undercover police 
officer or from anyone else. Upon first discovering the clubs 
lying in the creek in a garbage sack he thought they were 
discarded trash and did not even retrieve them until a couple of 
days later (Tr. Tr. - 115). 
Additional reason to discredit the verdict lies in the 
improbability of the identification of Defendant by the victim as 
the person he had seen on the night of the loss of the clubs. In 
addition to the fact of Defendant's transfer of the property to 
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Mr. Williams, which Defendant freely admits, the State presented 
to the jury testimony from Mr. Daye that he could identify 
Defendant as an individual he had seen in the vicinity of the 
high school and City Market on the night of the loss. Yet this 
same witness was unable to pick Mr. Schultz out of a photo lineup 
at an earlier time. (Tr. Tr. - 59; 105). Interestingly, the 
witness apparently could not "identify" Defendant as the person 
he had seen until after he talked with his uncle Scott, a law 
enforcement offi cer. 
This unlikely identification reaches the required 
inherently improbable standard. It takes no leap of imagination 
to discern its effect on the jury. Without such testimony the 
jury probably believes Defendant's statement that he innocently 
found the clubs after they had been taken by another. With such 
testimony the jury is disposed to determine Defendant the actor 
rather than an unlucky finder. 
Such improbability mandates reversal. 
III. SENTENCING 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a sentence will 
not be disturbed unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or is 
an abuse of discretion State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 
1978), cited in State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986), 
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State v. Russel1, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990). The judgment imposed 
is within legal limits, however, it is an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court felt the necessity of a pre-sentence 
report on the day of the verdict. Clearly this indicated a 
perceived need by the Court to gain information about Defendant 
to determine what actions were appropriate. 
The pre-sentence report is provided for in Section 76-
3-404 of the Utah Code. Its purpose in providing intimate 
information concerning the particular Defendant is to enable the 
judge to appropriately exercise his discretion in sentencing. 
Therefore rescinding the order for a pre-sentence report once the 
Court has determined its need is an abuse of discretion. 
"Although the judge was not required to order the evaluation in 
the first place, he was not free arbitrarily to revoke the order 
without good reasons for so doing." Dissenting opinion of 
Justice Maughan, Gerrard, supra, at 889. 
The reason that such revocation is arbitrary and 
reversible is because it is based on emotion and contempt for 
Defendant rather than on the basis of a prepared report. 
This case should be distinguished from Shelby the 
Defendant committed and additional felony on probation. Unlike 
Mr. Schultz, who entered a treatment program voluntarily, the 
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Shelby Court found that the Defendant had not made any 
significant changes in his life. In Shelby probation was not 
warranted. In this case, we cannot determine if probation is 
warranted because of the wrongful decision of the judge to 
rescind the evaluation. 
CONCLUSION 
Three bases of reversible error exists in this matter. 
Panelist Hopper was improperly allowed to remain on the jury 
after a valid challenge for cause by Defendant. Reasonable minds 
have reasonable doubts as to Defendant's guilt. Denying 
Defendant a presentence report after having declared the need for 
one is an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Defendant urges that any one of the above errors is 
sufficient for reversal. Cumulativley, there can be no doubt 
that Defendant was denied his right to a fair and impartial 
trial, or that the Court has abused its discretion in its harsh 
sentencing. The jury verdict must be reversed, or Defendant 
should be resentenced after appropriate investigation by Adult 
Parole and Probation. 
DATED this ^>^\ day of \I*v~l , 1994. 
i*/3d 
Wi11iam L. schultz 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 
RULE 18, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular 
juror and may be taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to 
the person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on 
whose complaint the prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary 
or other relationship between the prospective juror and any 
party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or 
injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a 
verdict which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror 
shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or 
employed b> the state or a political subdi/is'on t!'--"-^: 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part the juror with 
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantive rights of the party challenging; but no person shall 
be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or 
expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to 
such jury, found upon public rumor, statements in public journals 
or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court 
that the juror can and will, not withstanding such opinion, act 
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
CRIMINAL CODE 
76-3-404. Presentence investigation and diagnostic evaluation --
Commitment of defendant -- Sentencing procedure. 
(1) (a) (i) In felony cases where the court is of the opinion 
imprisonment may be appropriate but desires more 
detailed information as a basis for determining the 
sentence to be imposed than has been provided by the 
presentence report, the court may in its discretion 
commit a convicted defendant to the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for a diagnostic evaluation 
for a period not exceeding 90 days, 
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall conduct a 
complete study and evaluation of the defendant during 
that time, inquit mg iriLu matters incluC'i.o: 
(A) the defendant's previous delinquency or criminal 
experience; 
(B) his social background; 
(C) his capabilities; 
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical health; and 
(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs which may 
be available to suit his needs. 
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or by 
the expiration of additional commitment time the court 
may grant, not exceeding a further period of 90 days, 
the defendant shal1 be returned to the court for 
sentencing and the court, prosecutor, and the defendant 
or his attorney shall be provided with a written 
diagnostic evaluation report of results of the study, 
including any recommendations the Department of 
Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will be 
helpful to a proper resolution of the case, 
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court 
is supplemental to and becomes a part of the 
presentence investigation report, 
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation report and 
recommendations, the court shall proceed to sentence a 
defendant in accordance with the sentencing 
alternatives provided under Section 76-3-201. 
(2) Any commitment for presentence investigation under this 
section does not constitute a commitment to prison. However, any 
person who is committed to prison following proceedings under 
this section shall be given credit against his sentence for the 
time spent in confinement for a presentence investigation report. 
SEVENTH DtS—"-" COURT 
FILED JUN U ^ 3 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Criminal No. 9217-277 
Held in the Courtroom of said Court, at Moab, Grand 
County, State of Utah, on the 16th day of June, 1993, present the 
Honorable Bruce Halliday, District Court Judge. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Against: DALE RICHARD SCHULTZ 
DOB: 07/11/53 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON 
William L. Benge, for Plaintiff 
Sandra Starley, for Defendant 
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing 
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court 
and represented by counsel, Sandra Starley, and defendant having 
heretofore been found guilty by a jury of the crime of: 
THEFT OF LOST, MISLAID, OR MISTAKENLY DELIVERED 
PROPERTY, a THIRD DEGREE FELONY, in violation of Section 76-6-
407, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; 
and the defendant stating to the Court that he has no legal 
1 
reason to advance why judgment should not be pronounced, the 
Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of the law as 
follows, to-wit: 
That you, DALE RICHARD SCHULTZ, be imprisoned in the 
State Prison of the State of Utah, in the County of Salt Lake, 
for a term NOT TO EXCEED FIVE (5) YEARS, 
You, DALE RICHARD SCHULTZ, are hereby remanded to the 
custody of the Sheriff or other proper officer of the Grand 
County Jail of the State of Utah for transfer to the custody of 
the Utah State Prison. —76^ 
DATED this /g? day of June, 1993. 
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